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COURT REFORM FROM BAIL TO JAIL 
Wade H. McCree, Jr. * 
COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL. By Mal-
colm M. Feeley. New York: Basic Books. 1983. Pp. xvii, 251. 
$14.95. 
Court reform is an endeavor that has never wanted for practi-
tioners, but if contemporary criticism of the courts is to be credited, 
success, except in mostly isolated and insignificant instances, has 
eluded the reformers. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, the late Chief Justice of 
New Jersey, is remembered for his admonition that court reform is 
"no sport for the short-winded."1 
Malcolm Feeley, a political scientist, has written a useful book 
which, as its subtitle proclaims, expatiates his analysis of the reasons 
why so many loudly trumpeted reforms have failed to fulfill their 
promise. Like most writers in this field, Feeley focuses on the role of 
American courts in the criminal justice system, the face of the law 
whose blemishes are most familiar to the public. Professor Feeley is 
well-informed about the workings of the criminal justice system and 
he tests his thesis in examining four recent efforts to reform the sys-
tem: bail reform, pretrial diversion, sentence reform, and the reduc-
tion of trial delay. 
His operating premise is that courts are complex institutions with 
components and participants whose different and often conflicting 
goals and priorities must remain in a state of accommodation if the 
criminal justice system is to function at all. Some of these interact-
ing elements are the victim, the accused, the arresting officer, the 
arraigning magistrate, the bail bondsman, the prosecuting attorney, 
defense counsel (retained or appointed), investigators, witnesses, the 
trial judge, and the probation officers who investigate for pre-sen-
tence reports and supervise probationers. A reform that changes the 
accustomed role of any one of these participants without serious re-
gard for what Feeley calls its "hydraulic pressure" on all the other 
players in the process is likely to give rise to other and different 
problems, perhaps as serious as the one addressed by the reform, by 
skewing the working balance that has developed. He also reminds 
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us that only a small percentage of all offenders go through the courts 
and that our expectations of the results of a court reform should be 
tempered by that fact. Certainly, for that reason, courts should not 
bear the primary responsibility for a perceived rise in crime - the 
usual catalyst for campaigns to reform the courts. Feeley is no 
friend of crisis-inspired court reform. 
In the body of the book he proceeds to examine the four innova-
tions that he has selected, to identify the assumptions underlying 
them, to appraise the expectations concerning them, and to identify 
and explain the reasons for their failure. 
His discussion of bail reform includes an account 6f the familiar 
early work of the Vera Institute of Justice in New Yor~. Under the 
leadership of Herbert Sturz, project staff interviewed persons who 
had been arrested about prior criminal records, family ties, employ-
ment and school experience, length of residence in the community, 
and other factors believed to be relevant to predicting attendance at 
future court proceedings if the arrested person should be released on 
his personal recognizance.2 
· Feeley concludes his discussion of bail reform by observing that 
the project worked only as long as there were funds (from the Vera 
Institute) to employ persons outside the criminal justice system to 
interview the detainees. When these funds and other outside sup-
port, including Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(LEAA) money, dried up, many courts that had "experimented" 
with the reform reverted to dependence on bail bondsmen because 
overworked public defenders lacked the resources to procure the 
background information needed to inform the bail-setting function 
of the court. ' 
Feeley's treatment of pretrial diversion begins with the recogni-
tion that informal diversion has long been practiced in America as 
part of prosecutorial discretion and that many effective defense at-
torneys have been successful in having charges dropped if their cli-
ents would make restitution, or, during wartime, enter the .armed 
forces. He traces the origins of special diversion programs con-
ducted by the Vera Institute and by other sponsors using LEAA and, 
before that, other federal funds authorized in the Manpower Devel-
opment and Training Act of 1962. The theory behind this reform 
was that unemployment is a factor in criminal conduct and that if an 
off ender could obtain a job he would be less likely to be driven to 
criminal activity. Feeley believes that diversion has fallen from pop-
2. Feeley is apparently not aware that the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan inaugurated a similar release on recognizance project in 1960 under Chief 
Judge Theodore Levin. Sturz has acknowledged that this program, then unknown to him, 
antedated the program that he subsequently launched in New York. See .Doing Beller By 
Themselves, TIME, June 3, 1966, at 44. 
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ularity because it failed to involve defense counsel sufficiently. Also, 
since persons charged with serious crimes were rarely eligible for di-
version, many defense lawyers preferred to bargain informally for 
outright dismissal of the charge or for its reduction to a noncriminal 
violation instead of subjecting the client, if found eligible for diver-
sion, to supervision and the possibility of prosecution in the future. 
Feeley compares the disappointment with diversion to the disillu-
sionment with juvenile courts, a much-heralded innovation seventy-
five years ago. There, too, great hopes were inspired but, as pointed 
out in In re Gault ,3 new problems were created. 
The two remaining reforms that he examines, measures to reduce 
sentence disparity and trial delay, have also failed to achieve the ex-
pectations of their sponsors, essentially because of inadequate analy-
sis of the causes of the problems and because of the absence of 
judicial support. Although these reforms, unlike bail reform and 
pretrial diversion, did not require a new agency and funding, they 
nevertheless altered the way things were done without convincing 
the actors that change was needed. In an adversary system, delay is 
rarely neutral, and it will be used by the party to whose advantage it 
will work in a given case. Courts may have little interest in which 
case will be tried first, and sometimes delay promotes settlement. 
Feeley is no curmudgeon who denounces court reform as unde-
sirable or unachievable. He intends, however, to convince the reader 
of the difficulties inherent in the process, and he succeeds. And this 
is all that the title of the book promises. 
Nevertheless, he undertakes in his final chapter, "Toward a Strat-
egy of Change," to indicate how court reform might be undertaken 
successfully. After observing that many unanticipated but much 
less-dramatic-than-expected benefits have resulted from reforms that 
failed, he praises, with good cause, the significant contributions of 
the Vera Institute as an outside research and development agency for 
the system in New York. He reiterates his warning about avoiding 
sweeping new policy programs in response to a perceived crisis and 
asserts his preference for what he calls a problem-oriented approach, 
a concept that he does not develop adequately. 
In his chapter on strategy Feeley demonstrates a surprising confi-
dence in and reliance on the courts and litigation to effect reforms in 
the criminal justice system. He writes: 
Litigation is well suited to pursuing change in complex institutions. It 
is problem specific: it focuses on particular problems and individuals. 
It is ameliorative: remedies can be tailored to fit specific conditions 
and circumstances. It is incremental: it proceeds by steps, leading to 
concrete remedies. It is experimental: if one remedy fails, another can 
be substituted, or a successful approach can be used again and en-
3. 387 U.S. I (1967). 
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larged. And litigation is relatively inexpensive: it does not require that 
legislative majorities be mobilized. In contrast, legislation is general. 
In order to pass, it must often be left vague. It is time-consuming and 
costly. And because legislatures are keenly aware of pubic opinion, it 
tends to elevate the atypical - the newspaper headline - to the usual. 
Finally, legislative failures are more difficult to acknowledge, let alone 
change, than court orders. [P. 214, footnote omitted]. 
The closest he comes to telling us why he chooses the courts as the 
preferred forum for reform is, "Adversarial combat asserting rights 
is the hallmark of the judicial process" (p. 215). 
Court action in the areas discussed here does not preclude legislative 
action and should in fact stimulate it. I have emphasized the potential 
importance of the courts in an effort to counter the growing belief that 
courts do not have the capacity to tackle complex social problems. 
New bureaucratic institutions that try to prop up shortcomings of the 
criminal court system (for example, diversion programs, pretrial re-
lease agencies) are not compatible with the adversary process. Slow, 
incremental adjustments aimed at concrete problems are preferable to 
wholesale changes based upon the illusions of formalism. Finally, the 
solution to the failings of the adversary process ~s strengthening the 
process, not trying to circumvent it. [Pp. 215-16]. 
Feeley seems to be shifting his case here. Throughout the pre-
ceding chapters he emphasized the need for reformers to take into 
account the interests of all players in the criminal justice system. In-
deed, he finds that fragmentation is one of the "central and continu-
ing obstacles to change in the criminal justice system" (p. 205), and 
that the adversary process is one of the basic components reinforcing 
that fragmentation (p. 11). It is incongruous for him to contend later 
that the adversary process is the best approach to such delicate, 
multi-faceted interest balancing. 
But for this terminal confusion, this is a useful book that should 
be read by anyone considering any reform of the criminal justice 
system and by serious students of its operation. 
